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Abstract. Handling faults is a growing concern in HPC; greater 
varieties, higher error rates, larger detection intervals and silent 
faults are expected in the future. It is projected that, in exascale 
systems, errors will occur several times a day, and that they will 
propagate to generate errors that will range from process crashes 
to corrupted results, with undetected errors in applications that 
are still running. In this article, we analyze a methodology for 
transient fault detection (called SMCV) for MPI applications. The 
methodology is based on software replication, and it assumes that 
data corruption is made apparent producing different messages 
between replicas. SMCV allows obtaining reliable executions with 
correct results, or, at least, leading the system to a safe stop. This 
work presents a complete characterization, formally defining the 
behavior in the presence of faults and experimentally validating it 
in order to show its efficacy and viability to detect transient faults 
in HPC systems. 
Keywords: transient faults, detection, scientific parallel applications, 
silent data corruption, HPC, fault injection. 
1. Introduction 
Processor clock frequency stagnation has resulted in performance 
improvements being achieved through increasing the number of 
components. System escalation involves to the problem of a decrease in 
tension which, together with sub-micron miniaturization challenges, 
results in great increases in failure rates. Electromagnetic interferences 
generate current pulses that alter the values that are stored or in 
combinational logics. The higher variability in manufacturing processes 
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causes inconsistent behaviors, while aging results in permanent errors 
being more frequent and the likelihood of multiple failures has also 
increased [1,2]. Because all of this, system reliability has become critical, 
especially in the area of High-Performance Computing (HPC) with more 
than hundreds of thousands of cores. Recent studies in modern 
supercomputers show that Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) are just 
a few hours [3], and it is estimated that they could even get to about 30 
minutes in large parallel applications in exascale platforms. 
Consequently, these applications will not be able to progress efficiently 
without appropriate help [4,5]. The main concern is in relation to silent 
failures, namely Silent Data Corruption (SDC), with numerous reports 
and studies on their probabilities and impacts surfacing [2,6,7]. By 
potentially causing invalid results, SDCs create serious problems in 
science, which increasingly relies on large-scale simulations. For all these 
reasons, SDC mitigation is one of the major challenges for current and 
future resilience. 
SDCs appear as bit-flips (change in the value of a bit) that affect the 
storage or the cores. To detect or correct them, manufacturers add more 
powerful Error Correcting Codes (ECC) in the memory, protect buses 
with parity bits, and add redundancy to the circuits of some logical units 
[8]. However, adding hardware redundancy to the registry and processor 
arithmetical logic units is too costly [9].  
The small supercomputer market, which requires high reliability, can be 
satisfied with double- and triple-redundancy solutions to achieve detection 
and correction, respectively. Even though the cost of doing this is high, it is 
preferable to having corrupt results. SDCs remain latent until the altered data 
are used, and detection latencies depend on the application.  
The standard, most commonly used method to handle errors in current 
parallel systems (particularly those that run MPI applications), is 
recording periodical checkpoints. In case of failure, the 
Checkpoint/Restart (C/R) method re-launches the application from the 
last checkpoint. Unfortunately, the overhead for using C/R increases with 
the number of cores. Taking into account the time required for C/R and 
re-launch, a significant amount of useful computation time could be 
wasted if the MTBF is very low. The situation gets worse if computation 
is strongly coupled, since an error in one node could be propagated to the 
others in micro-seconds [1,10]. 
The traditional model based on C/R assumes that detection is almost 
immediate. Additionally, if the stored checkpoint contains undetected 
failures, recovery will not be possible. The few general detection 
techniques currently available introduce high overheads in parallel 
applications [2,11]. Based on all this, detection latency ranges are 
expected to increase, making the problem even worse due to SDCs. There 
are no efficient containment mechanisms, either which means that a 
failure that affects one task can result in the application crash or in 
incorrect outputs that, in a best-case scenario, are only detected after 
execution is complete and which are very hard to correct. 
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Replication at process-level has proven to be a reliable alternative, but in 
order to make it appealing for HPC, there are some challenges still to be 
solved, such as minimizing time and resource utilization overheads, 
ensuring that the inner states of the replicas are equivalent to one another 
(which is not trivial, since non-deterministic operations could be run), and 
reducing energy consumption. Traditionally, SDC are detected by 
replicating executions and comparing the results obtained. RedMPI [2] 
does this at the level of the processes, but there are other methods that do 
it at the level of the threads [12]. Other solutions that require less 
resources and are less accurate have also been explored, such as 
approximate replication, which implements upper and lower limits for 
computation results [1]. 
 In this context, the SMCV methodology [13,14] has been proposed in 
recent years. SMCV is designed to detect transient failures in HPC, 
specifically for scientific applications that use MPI on multicore clusters. 
SMCV allows obtaining reliable executions with correct results or, at the 
very least, report the occurrence of SDCs and taking the system to a safe 
stop after a limited detection latency, saving significant time, especially in 
long applications. 
The remaining sections of this document are organized as follows: 
Section 2 reviews some basic concepts, while Section 3 describes related 
work. Section 4 details the strategy used in SMCV, in which the behavior 
in case of failure, its Sphere of Replication (SoR), and its vulnerabilities 
are formally defined. Section 5 describes the experiments carried out 
through a controlled fault injection, in order to validate the behavior 
defined and showing the efficacy and viability of SMCV to detect 
transient failures in HPC systems. Finally, in Section 6, the conclusions 
and future lines of work are presented. 
2. Basic Concepts 
Depending on the impact on application execution, transient faults can be 
classified as follows [13]:  
 Latent Error (LE): it affects data that are not used afterwards, so it 
does not have an impact on results. 
 Detected Unrecoverable Error (DUE): it causes an anomaly that the 
system software can detect and that is unrecoverable; it usually causes 
the application to end abruptly. 
 Time Out Error (TO): the program does not end within a given 
period of time. 
 Silent Data Corruption (SDC): it is not detected by any system 
software level, and its effects are propagated until the program ends 
with an incorrect output. In parallel applications with message passing, 
these can cause: Transmitted Data Corruption (TDC), which affects data 
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that are part of the contents of the messages to be transmitted (if 
undetected, it propagates to other processes), or Final Status Corruption 
(FSC), where the altered data are not transmitted, but they are 
propagated locally, corrupting the final status of the affected process. 
3. Related Work 
Current technologies cannot deal with frequent SDCs. Existing algorithmic 
solutions [15] can only be applied to specific kernels; hence, mechanisms that 
allow dealing with the errors that are beyond their scope should be assessed. 
On the other hand, compiler- or runtime software-based detection strategies 
can be applied to any code, but they are more complex in nature. 
Contention aims to avoid the propagation to other nodes of the damage 
caused by the fault, or to prevent it from corrupting the data stored as a 
checkpoint, which would make recovery impossible [1]. In [16], the 
authors propose the use of redundancy in HPC systems, which allows 
increasing system availability and offers a trade-off between the number 
of components and their quality. In [17], the authors show that replication 
is more efficient than C/R in situations where MTBF is low and the time 
overhead of C/R is high. Software-redundancy solutions are focused on 
replication at the level of the threads [12], processes [9] and machine 
status to remove the need for expensive hardware. 
MR-MPI [19] is another proposal for transparent redundancy in HPC - it 
offers partial replication (only some processes are replicated); it can be used 
in combination with C/R in non-replicated processes [20,21].  
rMPI [18] is a protocol for the redundant execution of MPI applications, 
focused on failures that cause the system to stop; it used the profiling 
layer to interpose MPI functions. Each node has a replica so, in case of a 
permanent failure, the redundant node continues without interruptions; 
the application fails if two corresponding replicas fail. Redundancy 
scales, i.e., the probability of simultaneous failure of a node and its 
replica decreases when the number of nodes increases, at the cost of 
duplicating the amount of resources used and quadrupling the number of 
messages. RedMPI [2] is a MPI library that exploits rMPI's process 
replication to detect and correct SDC, comparing at the receiver the 
messages sent by replicated issuers. It implements an optimization based 
on hashing to avoid sending all messages and comparing their entire 
contents. It does not require application code modifications and it ensures 
that replicas are run deterministically. Results show that it can protect 
applications even with high failure rates with time overheads below 30%, 
so it can potentially be used on large-scale systems. The authors in [2] 
analyze the propagation of SDCs among nodes through MPI 
communications, and they show that even a single transient failure can 
have a deep effect on the application, causing a cascading corruption 
pattern towards all other processes.  
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The same as SMCV, by focusing on messages, RedMPI monitors the most 
critical data for the application; communication correction is necessary to 
output correction. Since SDC can affect data that are not communicated 
immediately, the failure is detected upon transmission. However, unlike 
SMCV, RedMPI performs its validation on the receiver side. This is because, 
on the side of the issuer, all replicas must communicate with the others to 
verify their contents internally before sending the message. This results in 
additional overhead and latency, since the receiver loses all that time before 
being able to continue. Since SMCV replicates at the level of the threads and 
not the processes, it does not need to send messages among issuers for 
validation. By sending just one message after the validation, it does not cause 
network congestion. The same as SMCV, with RedMPI corruption remains 
confined to a process, even without correction. It also allows customizing 
replica mapping on the same physical node as the native processes (or in their 
neighbors with lower network latency).  
4. Characterizing SMCV 
In this section, SMCV is characterized. 
4.1  Brief Review of SMCV  
SMCV is a detection strategy that is based on validating the contents of the 
messages that are going to be sent among processes in deterministic parallel 
applications. It is designed to detect failures that cause SDCs (both 
variants) and TO. SMCV duplicates each application process in a thread, 
and it requires synchronization mechanisms between both concurrent 
replicas. When a communication is about to be established, the thread stops 
running and waits for its replica to catch up to it, and all message fields, 
calculated by both replicas, are compared in search for differences. If they 
match, only one of the threads sends the message, preventing errors to be 
propagated to other processes without using additional bandwidth. The 
receiver is synchronized with its replica, it receives the message and makes 
a copy for the replica, and then both replicas continue the execution. When 
they finish, results are verified to detect failures that may have been locally 
propagated to the end of the application. 
4.2  Behavior in Case of Failure 
In this section, the behavior of the detection methodology is described. 
Figure 1(a) shows a diagram with the possible status of an execution 
when there are no strategies implemented, while Figure 1(b) shows the 
same diagram when SMCV is applied. Ellipses represent statuses and 
arrows represent events that cause the transition from one status to 
another. Transitions are numbered, and each of them is described. 
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4.3  Sphere of Replication 
Sphere of Replication [9] is a commonly accepted concept to describe 
the logical redundant execution domain of a given technique and specify 
the limits for failure detection. All data that enter the SoR are 
replicated, execution within its scope is redundant in some form, and 
output data are compared to ensure data correction before they leave it. 
Any execution outside the SoR is not covered for failures and should be 
protected by other means. The original concept of SoR was used to 
define reliability limits for redundant hardware designs, placing it 
around specific units. However, its application is not suitable for 
proposals implemented in software, despite which there are some 
solutions that use the compiler to insert redundant instructions that have 
tried imitating a SoR centered on hardware [22]. On the other hand, the 
failure detection paradigm centered on software places the SoR around 
software layers [9]. This shows that, even though failures affect 
hardware, only those that affect application accuracy are relevant, while 
it is safe to ignore those that remain latent. The disadvantage of this 
approach, however, is that detection is delayed until the error is 
confirmed through invalid data leaving the SoR, which means that a 





1. The affected bit is not used. 
2. The affected bit is used by the application.  
3. The altered bit affects data controlled by the operating system. 
4. The altered bit affects user application data. 
5. The altered bit causes the application to become unresponsive within a time limit. 
6. The operating system detects the failure and aborts the application. 
7. The affected data are transmitted to other process in the parallel application. 
8. The affected data are only used by the local process. 
9. Runtime. 
10. SMCV detects the failure after some time and leads to a safe stop. 
Fig. 1. Diagram of execution statuses. (a) No failure detection strategy. (b) SMCV 
as detection strategy. 
(a) (b) 
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SMCV is a software technique and, as such, adopts a SoR centered on 
software. Its objective is detecting failures that affect data that are 
handled inside processor registers, which are the most vulnerable part of 
the computer due to the difficulties involved with the implementation of 
hardware protection. As already explained, SMCV replicates in a thread 
the computations carried out by each process of the parallel application. 
Each thread operates on a local copy of the input data that is generated 
so that computation can be independent from that done on the replica. 
Therefore, the SoR is placed around the user application and its data, and 
it does not include the operating system or the communications library. 
Even though the memory is outside the SoR of SMCV, the use of global 
variables is not recommended, since they are centralized points of 
failure. If a failure that alters global variable occurs, both redundant 
threads would use the wrong value and, if no other failure occurred, 
SMCV would detect no errors. 
4.4  Multiple Failures and Vulnerabilities 
Most existing proposals can detect failures if it is assumed that a single bit-flip 
occurs during execution, but they are not as effective for failures that affect 
multiple bits. Fortunately, there are only two situations in which multiple failures 
can be combined to cause issues. The first of these situations is when the same bit 
is altered in both replicas, which results in a correct comparison and the failure is 
not detected. The second situation is when the failure affects one of the replicas, 
and the result of the verification is also altered, masking the original failure. 
However, the likelihood that any of these combinations occurs is very low, so 
they can be ignored without any serious risks. All other combinations of multiple 
failures are detected as simple failures as soon as the first difference is detected 
during verification [22]. SMCV can detect any simple transient failure that causes 
SDC or TO, but it does not support related multiple failures.  
All failure tolerance techniques have vulnerabilities, i.e., circumstances under 
which they cannot detect the failures that effectively affect execution. The design 
characteristics of a strategy and the tests to which it is subjected (usually through 
failure injection) must allow making those vulnerabilities explicit.  
Vulnerabilities are typically associated to failures that affect the detection 
mechanism itself [9], and SMCV is no exception. SMCV minimizes the delay 
between the time data are checked and the time when the validated values are 
used because verification is done when the data in a message are about to be 
used. This reduces the likelihood of failure in the time between both events (as 
in [22]); once the data are in the output buffer, they are outside of the SoR. On 
the other hand, checking the values to be sent is a centralized point of failure. If 
any error is detected when checking the data after a correct execution, a false 
positive has occurred and a safe stop is generated when the problem was in fact 
introduced by the detector itself. This vulnerability can be improved by a 
double comparison; however, even though it is not entirely reliable, partial 
redundancy in general is enough to meet user requirements [9]. Similarly, if 
validation is correct after a faulty execution, it means that the failure remained 
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hidden due to a second failure occurring. As already mentioned, SMCV cannot 
deal with this situation, but the likelihood of this happening is extremely low 
[22]. Additionally, the fact that SMCV can detect as TOs other failures that 
would be vulnerabilities if no such mechanism were available should also be 
considered. For instance, if an operation code is modified in such a manner that 
the resulting instruction is sending a message, or if a failure occurs while the 
tool is running, both replicas separate their execution flows. When one of them 
sends a message, synchronization is not successful, and the failure is detected 
after a period of time longer than the one established.  
5. Validating Detection Efficacy  
A number of tests were carried out to validate SMCV's detection efficacy. 
The application used was a parallel matrix multiplication MPI application 
(C=A×B) under the Master/Worker paradigm, where the Master participates 
in result computation [13]. The application operates as follows: 
 The Master process divides matrix A among all Worker nodes and, 
using the function MPI_Scatter, sends a piece of the matrix to each 
one of them, keeping a piece for itself to calculate its portion of the 
resulting matrix.  
 The Master sends a complete copy of matrix B to each Worker using 
the function MPI_Broadcast. 
 All processes compute their respective pieces of matrix C, and then 
send their results to the Master process using function MPI_Gather. 
 The Master builds matrix C using the pieces sent back by the 
Workers and its own results.  
For the validation step, the application was adapted for integration with 
the functionality offered by SMCV as described in [14]. To do this, the 
source code of the application has to be modified, with the subsequent 
recompilation. The experiment consisted in injecting faults in a controlled 
manner at several points of the application using the GDB debugging 
tool1. To do this, a breakpoint is inserted on one of the running processes, 
the value of a variable is modified, and execution is resumed. Thus, a bit-
flip is simulated in a processor register, since data corruption manifests 
itself if there is an observable difference between replica memory 
statuses. Even though transient faults can occur at any place and time 
during the execution, significant points were selected for this controlled 
injection process, both in relation to the computation done by the Master 
and that done by the Workers. 
 
                                                          
1 GDB is available at www.gnu.org/software/gdb/ 
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Fig. 2. Output of a run with no faults. The time to attach the debugger is shown. 
 
Fig. 3. Example showing how to attach the debugger to inject faults. 
 
Fig. 4. Injection of a fault that causes FSC. 
Fig. 5. Output when a FSC occurred using SMCV as detection strategy. 
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For the experiments, five processes were used (one Master and four Workers) 
and 10x10 square matrixes, so each of the five processes calculates two rows 
of matrix C. Even though this size does not really require parallel execution, 
it is used solely to show the consequences of failure injection and SMCV's 
detection capabilities. The experimental platform is an Intel Core i5-2310 
2.9Ghz CPU with 6MB L3 cache memory and 8GB RAM, and the operating 
system is GNU/Linux Ubuntu 14.04.  
Figure 2 shows a normal run of the application, with no fault injection. 
The initial count corresponds to the time used to attach the debugger to 
one of the processes, in order to simulate a fault that affects data used by 
that process. Figure 3 shows how the debugger is attached to perform the 
injection experiments. 
Figure 4 shows the procedure carried out to inject a fault during the 
execution of the Master process in one of the first 20 elements in matrix 
A (those kept for local computation), after executing function 
MPI_Scatter but before the multiplication operation. This situation 
simulates the occurrence of a failure that corrupts a datum that is used for 
computing the result, but is never transmitted to other process in the 
application, causing FSC. Figure 5 shows the output of the application, 
with error detection and safe stop. 
Figure 6 shows the injection of a fault during the operation of a Worker 
process in an element of matrix B after the execution of MPI_Broadcast 
but before the multiplication operation. This allows simulating the corruption 
of a datum that is part of the calculation carried out by that Worker. The 
results of these calculations are transmitted to the Master in the subsequent 
MPI_Gather, so the incorrect result (calculated using the altered value) is 
detected as TDC. Figure 7 shows the output of the application, with error 
detection and safe stop. Since the fault caused TDC, the output message is 
different from that of the previous case. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Injection of a fault that causes TDC. 
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Fig. 7. Output when TDC occurred using SMCV as detection strategy. 
 
Figure 8 shows the injection of a fault on an element of matrix C for one of the 
Workers. The subsequent multiplication operation overwrites the altered value, so 
the failure results in a LE. Consequently, Figure 9 shows that the output is normal 
and correct. 
Finally, Figure 10 shows the application output when a fault that causes TO has 
occurred; both detection and the safe stop can be seen. In this case, the failure is 
injected on a variable that acts as index, making one of the Worker replicas to 
restart its computation after it has already done part of its task. This causes a 
difference in time between the progress of both redundant threads, which is 
detected as a TO error. The ideal consequence of a failure that causes TO is that 
the process enters an infinite loop, but this behavior cannot be forced in the 
selected application with a simple failure. 
It should be noted that the time at which the failure is assumed to have 
occurred is configurable. There is no optimal value; it depends on each 
particular application. To clarify this, detection through TO is based on 
the premise that, in an application that is run on a dedicated homogeneous 
system, the execution times of two replicas that carry out the same 
computation should be similar [14]. Therefore, a notorious difference in 
processing times assumes that both replicas have separated their flows 
due to a silent fault. Thus, TO time should be configured based on what is 
to be expected for the application: if this value is too high, detection 
latency will increase; if it is too low, a small difference in computation 
times will result in the detection of a false positive. In the previous test, 
the injected failure only causes an abnormal delay in synchronization. A 
short time was deliberately configured to show that the mechanism can 
react to this event. However, if one of the processes went into an infinite 
loop, SMCV would be effective in detecting an error. 
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Fig. 8. Injection of a fault that causes LE. 
 
Fig. 9. Output of the execution when LE occured. 
 
Fig. 10. Output when TO occurred using SMCV as detection strategy. 
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5. Conclusions and Future Work  
As HPC systems are scale and the likelihood of node failures and SDC increases, 
the need to protect the data and obtaining availability at low cost becomes even 
more critical. Redundancy is a viable solution for detecting SDCs in the context 
of HPC. The fact that a single SDC causes deep effects on all processes that 
communicate, it can be concluded that protecting the applications at the level of 
the MPI messages is a feasible and effective method for detecting, isolating and 
preventing subsequent data corruption. 
Based on the tests carried out, it is concluded that SMCV is capable of 
detecting failures that affect message contents, notifying the user and leading 
the application to a safe step so that the data corruption does not propagate. 
On the other hand, in the case of failures that affect data that are kept for 
local computation, and those that occur during the final phase (corresponding 
to the FSC fraction), are detected when comparing the results. Finally, those 
failures that result in considerable asymmetries in the computation times of 
the replicas are detected through a TO mechanism.  
Our future work will include completing a transient failure-tolerant 
methodology that incorporates a recovery mechanism that is based on 
multiple incremental distributed checkpoints, so that a process can store 
information about the failure that occurred in another process, and thus 
determine if the last checkpoint is valid or if a previous one should be used 
for recovery [10]. 
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